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TAXING LEVERAGED INVESTMENTS OF
CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS: WHAT IS
THE RATIONALE?
Suzanne Ross McDowell*
CHARITABLE organizations1 generally are exempt from tax on
passive investment income. 2 If the property producing such in-
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1. The term "charitable organizations" is used in this Article to refer to all organiza-
tions that are described in section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986. These
organizations are exempt from tax under I.R.C. § 501(a) (1986). Section 501(c)(3) pro-
vides for the exemption of:
Corporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation, organized and
operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety,
literary, or educational purposes, or to foster national or international amateur
sports competition (but only if no part of its activities involve the provision of
athletic facilities or equipment), or for the prevention of cruelty to children or
animals, no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private
shareholder or individual, no substantial part of the activities of which is carry-
ing on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence legislation, (except as
otherwise provided in subsection (h)), and which does not participate in, or in-
tervene in (including the publishing or distributing of statements), any political
campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for public office.
I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1986).
2. The term "passive investment income" is not found in the Internal Revenue Code.
As used in this Article, it refers to the following types of income which are excluded from
the definition of unrelated business taxable income: "dividends, interest, payments with
respect to securities loans (as defined in section 512(a)(5))," annuities, royalties (as de-
scribed in I.R.C. § 512(b)(2)), rents (as described in I.R.C. § 512(b)(3)), "gains or losses
from the sale, exchange, or other disposition of property other than . . . stock in trade or
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come is acquired with borrowed funds, however, the debt-financed
property rules of section 5143 treat all or part of the income as
unrelated business taxable income with the result that it is subject
to tax.4
The tax treatment of income from the debt-financed invest-
ments of tax-exempt entities has been the subject of recurring de-
bate for forty years,5 and remains unsettled today. Congressional
action has ranged from narrow anti-abuse provisions,6 to broad
sweeping measures,7 to narrow piecemeal exceptions.8 Numerous
arguments have been presented for and against the taxation of
debt-financed property. 9 Nonetheless, the debate over the taxation
other property of a kind which would properly be includible in inventory if on hand at the
close of the taxable year, or . . .property held primarily for sale to customers in the ordi-
nary course of the trade or business ... [and] all gains on the lapse or termination of
[certain] options [as described in I.R.C. § 512(b)(5)]."I.R.C. § 512(b) (1986).
Certain other organizations and pension trusts described in § 401(a) are also exempt
from tax on passive investment income. See I.R.C. § 512(a)(3), (b)(1)-(3) & (5) (1986).
The scope of this Article is limited to charitable organizations although reference to other
exempt organizations and pension trusts are included where appropriate.
3. I.R.C. § 514 (1986). As is frequently the case in tax law, section 514 is a complex
statute with many intricate computations and exceptions. In general, section 514 requires
exempt organizations to include in their unrelated business taxable income a fraction of the
income received from any property with respect to which there is acquisition indebtedness
(debt incurred in connection with the acquisition or improvement of the property). The
fraction of income included is the average acquisition indebtedness with respect to the
property during the taxable year divided by the average adjusted basis of the property
during the taxable year. I.R.C. § 514(a) (1986). There are a number of exclusions from
the definition of debt-financed property, including the following: (1) property the use of
which is substantially related to the exempt purpose of the organization, (2) property used
for research activities, the income from which is specifically excluded from tax under sec-
tion 512, and (3) property used in certain other trades or businesses, the income from
which is excluded under section 513, namely, businesses run by volunteers, businesses run
for the convenience of members, students, etc., and businesses involving the sale of donated
property. I.R.C. § 514(b) (1986). In addition, there is an exception for the debt-financed
acquisition of real estate by "qualified organizations," namely, educational institutions and
pension trusts, if certain conditions are met. I.R.C. § 514(c)(9) (1986).
4. I.R.C. § 512(b)(4) (1986)(income from debt-financed property shall be character-
ized as "gross income derived from an unrelated trade or business" and shall be taxed).
5. Congress first dealt with the issue in 1950, when it passed legislation taxing in-
come from certain business leases. See infra notes 15-50 and accompanying text.
6. Id.
7. In 1969, Congress passed legislation taxing income from debt-financed property if
the property was unrelated to the tax-exempt organization's charitable function. See infra
notes 51-59 and accompanying text.
8. In 1980, Congress excepted certain real estate investments made by qualified pen-
sion trusts from the debt-financed property rules. See infra notes 60-69 and accompanying
text. Congress extended the same exception to schools in 1984. See infra notes 70-88 and
accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 112-60 and accompanying text.
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of income from debt-financed property continues. In spite of the
numerous amendments to this law, the policy behind it remains
unclear. Moreover, these amendments have created a law that dis-
tinguishes among charitable organizations in a manner that is ar-
,guably unfair.
This Article traces the historical development of the tax
treatment of income from debt-financed property,10 and examines
whether the current statute is an effective means of achieving the
objectives that have been articulated as the policy rationale for
the law."'
I. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW
A. Destination of Income Test
Prior to 1950, the exemption for a charitable organization
from federal income tax applied to all income of the organization,
so long as the income was dedicated to charitable purposes.' The
majority of courts held that the destination of an organization's
income, not its source, was the appropriate test for tax exemp-
tion.' 3 Under this so-called "destination of income" test, an organ-
ization engaged exclusively in commercial, non-exempt activities
was treated as exempt from tax if all its profits were distributed to
an exempt organization. 4
B. The Revenue Act of 1950
In 1950, Congress rejected the "destination of income" test
and imposed a tax on the unrelated business activities of tax-ex-
10. See infra notes 12-111 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 112-60 and accompanying text.
12. The federal tax law has expressly provided for tax exemption of charitable, reli-
gious, and educational organizations since 1894. In that year, the first federal act imposing
a general tax on the income and profits of corporations was enacted. Act of Aug. 27, 1894,
ch. 589, § 32, 28 Stat. 509, 556.
13. Trinidad v. Sagrada Orden de Predicadores, 263 U.S. 578 (1924); Sand Springs
Home v. Commissioner, 6 B.T.A. 198 (1927); see Note, Colleges, Charities and the Reve-
nue Act of 1950, 60 YALE LJ. 851, 854 n.18 (1951).
14. See Roche's Beach, Inc. v. Commissioner, 96 F.2d 776 (2d Cir. 1938)(corpora-
tion formed to hold property and conduct business granted tax exemption because all prof-
its were funnelled to a separate non-profit organization); C.F. Mueller Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 14 T.C. 922 (1950)(held that the corporation was not exempt because it was not
operated exclusively for charitable purposes), rev'd, 190 F.2d 120, 122 (3d Cir.
1951)("The instant case . . . fits squarely within the Roche's Beach decision as the pur-
pose of the corporation involved is wholly charitable.").
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empt organizations. 15 The legislative history indicates that the pri-
mary purpose of the tax was to eliminate the "unfair"' 6 competi-
tive advantage that tax exemption accorded exempt organizations
in business activities unrelated to their exempt purposes.'7 Certain
"passive" income was expressly excluded from the definition of
unrelated business taxable income. Specifically, the tax was not
imposed on dividends, interest, royalties (including overriding roy-
alties), rents (other than certain rents on property acquired with
borrowed funds), and gains from sales of leased property.', This
exclusion was justified on the ground that investments producing
15. In general, the unrelated business income tax (UBIT) is imposed on the unre-
lated business taxable income (UBTI) of organizations that are otherwise exempt from tax
under section 501(a). I.R.C. § 511(a) (1986). Tax-exempt trusts are taxed at individual
tax rates and all other exempt organizations are taxed at corporate rates. I.R.C. § 511(b)
(1986).
The term "unrelated trade or business" means any trade or business that is regularly
carried on and is not substantially related, aside from the need of the organization for
funds, to the performance of the purpose for which the organization was granted exempt
status. I.R.C. § 513(a) (1986). Specifically excluded from the term "unrelated trade or
business" is any trade or business in which substantially all the work is performed by vol-
unteers; which is carried on by a section 501(c)(3) organization or a state or city college or
university primarily for the convenience of its members, students, patients, officers, or em-
ployees; or which is selling merchandise received as gifts or donations. I.R.C. § 513(a)
(1986).
UBTI is defined as the gross income derived from any unrelated trade or business less
deductions directly connected with the carrying on of such trade or business, subject to
certain modifications. I.R.C. § 512(a) (1986). The most significant of these modifications is
the exclusion of passive income. I.R.C. § 512(b) (1986). See supra note 2 and accompany-
ing text.
Congress also enacted in 1950 the "feeder oganization" provisions of section 502. That
section provides that an organization operated for the primary purpose of carrying on a
trade or business for profit shall not be exempt on the ground that all of its profits are
payable to exempt organizations.
16. The meaning of the term "unfair" and the controversy over whether exempt or-
ganizations have any real competitive advantage over for-profit organizations have been the
subject of lively debate, particularly in recent years. See, e.g., Rose-Ackerman, Unfair
Competition and Corporate Income Taxation, in THE ECONOMICS OF NONPROFIT INSTITU-
TIONS: STUDIES IN STRUCTURE AND POLICY 394 (S. Rose-Ackerman ed. 1986); Note,
supra note 13, at 876.
17. H.R. REP. No. 2319, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 38-40 (1950).
18. Revenue Act of 1950, ch. 994, § 301(a), 64 Stat. 906, 948-49 (amending I.R.C.
§ 422 as it then existed)(currently codified at I.R.C. § 512(b) (1986)). The common prac-
tice is to refer to these exceptions collectively as the "passive income exception." This prac-
tice, however, is somewhat misleading, because all of these items are excludable without
regard to the active or passive nature of the activity that generated the income. But see
Disabled Am. Veterans v. United States, 650 F.2d 1178, 1189-90 (Ct. Cl. 1981)(rental of
exempt organization's mailing list was denied passive income treatment as a royalty under
I.R.C.§ 512(b) because the rental was "the product of extensive business activity"), affid,
704 F.2d 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
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such income "are 'passive' in character and are not likely to result
in serious competition for taxable businesses having similar in-
come." Furthermore, Congress noted that such investments had
"long been recognized as . . . proper . . . for educational and
charitable organizations."19
The exclusion for passive income, however, did not apply to
certain rents on property acquired with borrowed funds.2 0 These
rents were subjected to tax in an effort to prevent certain sale and
lease-back transactions21 that created unintended benefits. In such
transactions, a charitable organization would acquire a property
(such as real estate) from a taxable business, often borrowing to
finance the entire purchase price.22 As a condition of the sale, the
exempt organization would lease the property back to the seller on
a long-term basis. 23 The exempt organization would repay the
loan, plus interest, with the "rental" received from the seller-
lessee.24 As a result, the exempt organization, while investing and
risking little or none of its own funds, obtained the difference be-
tween the "rental" payments and the sale price, and eventually
secured title to the property outright.2 5 The seller treated the sale
price as a capital gain, and continued to operate the business, us-
ing the "rental" payments as large deductions against the com-
pany's taxable income.
Congress identified three principal problems with sale and
lease-back arrangements where borrowed funds were used. First,
the exempt organization was "trading on its exemption, since the
only contribution it [made] to the sale and lease[-back was] its
tax exemption. '26 Second, because exempt organizations could ac-
quire property through lease-backs without investing any of their
own funds, exempt organizations could conceivably come to "own
the great bulk of the commercial and industrial real estate in the
country," resulting in a serious erosion of the corporate and indi-
19. S. REP. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 30-31, reprinted in 1950 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 3053, 3083.
20. Revenue Act of 1950, ch. 994, § 301(a), 64 Stat. 906, 949 (amending I.R.C. §
422(a)(4) as it then existed)(currently codified at I.R.C. § 512(b)(4) (1986)).
21. S. REP. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 31-33, reprinted in 1950 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 3053, 3083-85.
22. Id. at 31, reprinted in 1950 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws at 3083.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 31, reprinted in 1950 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 3084; H.R.
REP. No. 2319, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 38 (1950).
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vidual income tax base. Third, the exempt organization may
have "sold" part of its exemption, either by paying a higher price
for the property or by charging lower rents than a taxable
business.2 8
In response to these three problems, Congress imposed the
unrelated business income tax on rentals from leases of real prop-
erty (and personal property leased in connection with it) if the
term of the lease exceeded five years (taking into account options
to renew) 29 and borrowed funds were used to acquire or improve
the realty.30 The tax was imposed on a fraction of the rentals
equal to the amount of outstanding indebtedness divided by the
adjusted basis of the property at the close of the taxable year. l
Deductions for taxes and other expenses were allowed on the same
pro rata basis.32 Exceptions were provided for leases entered into
for purposes "substantially related" to the basis for the organiza-
tion's exemption and to leases of premises "primarily designed for
occupancy, and occupied, by the organization.
Notwithstanding the changes made by the Revenue Act of
1950, tax-exempt organizations continued to enter sale and lease-
back transactions. Typically, the arrangements were structured as
three-party transactions. 4 Shareholders of a taxable corporation
(usually closely-held) would sell their stock to a charitable organi-
zation. The charity would pay for the stock with little or no down
payment and a nonrecourse promissory note. The charity would
then dissolve the corporation and lease its assets for a five-year
27. S. REP. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 31, reprinted in 1950 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 3053, 3084.
28. Id. See also Note, Taxation of Sale and Lease-Back Transactions, 60 YALE L.J.
879, 880 (1951)(analyzing non-tax consequences of sale and lease-back transactions); id. at
888 (unfair competition exists even if the property is not debt financed). Cf. Hall, The
Clay Brown Case and Related Problems, in U. So. CAL. 18TH TAX INST. 337 (1966)(ques-
tioning whether exempt organizations really were paying more than fair market value).
Even if the Hall article is correct in arguing that exempt organizations paid no more than
fair market value, the situation remains troublesome. As a matter of theory, exempt orga-
nizations would have the capability of delivering a price above fair market value, an option
unavailable to for-profit organizations.
29. Revenue Act of 1950, ch. 994, § 301(a), 64 Stat. 906, 950 (amending I.R.C. §
423(a) as it then existed).
30. Id. § 301(a), 64 Stat. at 951-52 (amending I.R.C. § 423(b) as it then existed).
31. Id. § 301(a), 64 Stat. at 952 (amending I.R.C. § 423(d)(1) as it then existed).
32. Id. (amending I.R.C. § 423(d)(2) as it then existed).
33. Id. § 301(a), 64 Stat. at 950 (amending I.R.C. § 423(a) as it then existed).
34. See Commissioner v. Brown, 380 U.S. 563, 566 (1965)(the leading case involv-
ing a three-party transaction); Belier, Exempt Organizations: Taxation of Debt-Financed
Income, 24 TAx LAW. 489, 490-92 (1971).
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term to a newly-formed corporation, which was usually owned by
associates of the former shareholders. The new corporation would
pay a large percentage of its profits as "rent" to the tax-exempt
entity, which would then turn over most of those payments to the
former shareholders as installment payments on the promissory
note.35
The 1950 legislation was ineffective against these transac-
tions. The selling shareholders were able to treat payments on the
promissory note as capital gain, the new corporation was able to
deduct the large "rent" payments, and the tax-exempt entity re-
ceived a portion of the new company's profits tax-free.36 The par-
ties avoided the tax imposed on rental income by the 1950 legisla-
tion by merely negotiating leases with a term of five years or
less. 7 In addition, payments made by the new corporations for the
lease of personal property in connection with real property were
treated as excludable "rent" when received by the exempt organi-
zation, even if the real estate in question comprised only a small
fraction of the assets leased. 8
The government failed in its efforts to attack these transac-
tions through administrative pronouncements and litigation. The
Internal Revenue Service issued an initial ruling which addressed
the effect of these transactions on exempt organizations .3 The rul-
ing stated that a foundation engaging in a three-way transaction
such as the one described above would not be considered to be
"engaged exclusively in activities coming within the contemplation
of section 101(6) of the Code" (current section 501(c)(3)).10 In
addition, the IRS cautioned that such income would not fall
within the exception to the unrelated business taxable income
rules for rent.41 Finally, the ruling suggested that tax-exempt or-
ganizations which entered these three-way transactions would ex-
pose themselves to a charge of unreasonable accumulation of in-
come under section 3814 (current section 4943).42
35. Belier, supra note 34, at 491.
36. Id. at 489, 491.
37. See Revenue Act of 1950, ch. 994, § 301(a), 64 Stat. 906, 950.
38. See University Hill Found. v. Commissioner, 51 T.C. 548, 570-71 (1969)(foun-
dation not required to pay income and excess profit taxes), rev'd, 446 F.2d 701 (9th Cir.
197 1)(foundation must pay tax on rental received from personal property leased along with
the real property), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 965 (1972).
39. Rev. Rul. 54-420, 1954-2 C.B. 128.
40. Id. at 130.
41. Id.
42. Id.
1988-89]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
In the courts, the IRS unsuccessfully attacked the capital
gain treatment claimed by the original corporation on the sale of
the property4s and the rental deductions claimed by the new cor-
poration.4 The Supreme Court ultimately decided the capital gain
issue in Clay Brown.4 5 In that case, the stock of a small lumber
company in California was sold to a tax-exempt foundation for a
small down payment and a promissory note. 6 The company was
liquidated and the assets leased for a five-year term to a new com-
pany, which paid eighty percent of its profits to the foundation as
"rent." 47 The foundation then paid ninety percent of the "rent" to
the former shareholders under the terms of the promissory note.48
When the former shareholders characterized the payments as cap-
ital gain, the Internal Revenue Service objected. 9 Justice White,
writing for a majority of the Court, sided with the shareholders.
He concluded that the foundation's lack of business risk in the
transaction had no bearing on the issue of whether it legally con-
stituted a "sale" for purposes of capital gain treatment.5
C. Tax Reform Act of 1969
Following the Clay Brown case and a similar decision by the
Tax Court in University Hill Foundation v. Commissioner,5 fur-
ther legislation was introduced to resolve the issue. 2 Testifying in
support of this legislation before the House Committee on Ways
and Means, the Treasury Department stated that three problems
were created by charitable organizations borrowing for investment
purposes. Two of these problems had been cited by Congress when
it enacted the business lease provisions in 1950: the erosion of the
43. Estate of Hawley, 20 T.C.M. (CCH) 210 (1961)(capital gains treatment al-
lowed); Union Bank v. United States, 285 F.2d 126 (Ct. Cl. 1961)(profits received as a
result of sale granted capital gains treatment).
44. E.g., Brekke v. Commissioner, 25 T.C.M. (CCH) 1063 (1966)(amounts paid
were deductible as rent).
45. Commissioner v. Brown, 380 U.S. 563 (1965).
46. Id. at 567.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 568.
50. Id. at 570.
51. 51 T.C. 548 (1969), rev'd, 446 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S.
965 (1972).
52. H.R. 15,942, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 112 CONG. REc. 14,356 (1966); H.R. 15,943,
89th Cong., 2d Sess., 112 CONG. REC. 14,356 (1966)(both bills would have imposed a tax
on income received by a tax-exempt organization from property, if the property was unre-
lated to the charity's exempt function and it was acquired with borrowed money).
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tax base that would result if exempt organizations could acquire
property without expending their own funds, and the selling by
charitable organizations of part of their exemption through the
payment of prices above fair market value." The third problem
cited by the Treasury Department was the ability of charitable
organizations to expand from within without regard to their level
of public support.5 4 Elaborating on this point, the Treasury De-
partment testified as follows:
By borrowing, the organization can extend the function of
its exemption beyond the protection of income stemming from
charitable contributions or membership fees; it can use the ex-
emption to develop funds even where there are noconf ibtions
or membership fees. . . . The organization which makes such
use of its exemption can sever itself from reliance upon contribu-
tors or members and eliminate the healthful scrutiny of its pur-
poses and activities which that reliance implies.
By this extension of its exemption privilege to borrowed as-
sets and this separation from dependence upon contributors or
members, the organization begins a multiplication of its holdings
which bears no relation to the community's evaluation of its ex-
empt activities; it embarks upon an extension of its economic
holdings which is limited only by the financial acumen and com-
mercial skills of its managers) 5
In 1969, Congress passed legislation which taxed income
from all debt-financed property (including tangible personal prop-
erty and business assets) if the property was unrelated to the or-
ganization's exempt function. As with the 1950 legislation, the tax
on the income from such property was dependent upon the rela-
tionship between the amount of indebtedness and the adjusted ba-
sis of the property financed.5 6 The exception for short-term leases
was eliminated.5 7 In the committee reports, Congress cited the
Clay Brown transaction as the reason for the legislation." Thd
53. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
54. Unrelated Debt-Financed Income of Tax-Exempt Organizations: Hearing on
H.R. 15,942 and H.R. 15,943 Before the House Committee on Ways and Means, 89th
Cong., 2d Sess. 21-22 (1966)[hereinafter Unrelated Debt-Financed Income](statement of
Stanley S. Surrey, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury).
55. Id.
56. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 121(d), 83 Stat. 487, 543-48
(current version at I.R.C. § 514 (1986)).
57. Id.
58. S. REP. No. 552, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. 62-63, reprinted in 1969 U.S. CODE,
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 2027, 2091-92; H.R. REP. No. 413, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. 44-46,
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committee reports made no reference to the Treasury Depart-
ment's concern about the ability of charitable organizations to
grow through leveraged investments. 9
D. Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1980
Eleven years later, in 1980, Congress enacted an exception to
the debt-financed property rules for certain real estate investments
of qualified pension trusts.60 Proponents of the exception made
two arguments. First, they claimed that the debt-financed prop-
erty rules did not apply to pension plan investments in bank com-
mon trust funds"' and life insurance company segregated asset ac-
counts, 62 and as a consequence, the tax law created a competitive
imbalance among financial intermediaries offering investment ser-
vices to qualified pension plans.6 3 Second, they argued that be-
cause of inflation, there was a need to facilitate real estate invest-
ments by qualified pension trusts.""
In testimony before the Subcommittee on Taxation and Debt
Management of the Senate Finance Committee, the Treasury De-
partment rejected each of the proponents' arguments. The first ar-
gument was rejected because the Treasury thought that as a mat-
ter of policy the income of common trust funds should retain its
character in the hands of its participants. 65 The second was re-
reprinted in 1969 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1645, 1690-91.
59. But in enacting an exception to the debt-financed property rules for qualified
pension plans in 1980, the Senate Finance Committee stated that "the 'Clay Brown' provi-
sions were designed in part to prevent uncontrolled growth of exempt organizations through
investments financed with debt .... " S. REP. No. 1036, 96th Cong., 2nd Sess. 29, re-
printed in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 7316.
60. Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-605, § 110, 94 Stat. 3521,
3525-26 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 514 (1986)).
61. Five Misc. Tax Bills: Hearings on S. 650 Before the Subcomm. on Taxation
and Debt Management Generally of the Senate Finance Comm., 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 295
(1980)[hereinafter Five Misc. Tax Bills](statement of Daniel I. Halperin, Deputy Assis-
tant Secretary of the Treasury).
62. Five Misc. Tax Bills, supra note 61, at 295. This position is reflected in I.R.C. §
801 (1986).
63. Five Misc. Tax Bills, supra note 61, at 295.
64. Id. at 295-96.
65. Id. at 295. The regulations under I.R.C. § 584 were subsequently amended to
provide that the debt-financed character of property held by a common trust fund "passed
through" to the fund's beneficiaries. See Treas. Reg. § 1.584-2(c)(4)(vi) (as amended in
1984). In 1984, Congress gave the Treasury regulatory authority to prevent the circumven-
tion of section 514 through segregated asset accounts, but no regulations have yet been
promulgated. See Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 1034(b), 98 Stat. 494,
1040.
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jected because debt-financing is not an essential, but only a con-
ventional, method of acquiring real estate . 6
Notwithstanding its reservations, the Treasury Department
did not oppose the exception enacted in 1980. Because of the sub-
stantial tax benefits available to taxable investors in real estate,
the Treasury Department concluded that exempt investors were
not likely to have an advantage over taxable investors if they were
exempt from tax on debt-financed real estate investments.6 7 Fur-
ther, the Treasury concluded that an exception limited to pension
funds could be justified on the ground that the exemption for in-
vestment income was the raison d'etre of the exemption granted
to pension funds; whereas the exemption for investment income
was a mere "by-product" of exemptions granted to other organi-
zations. For this reason, Treasury was "less troubled" by allowing
pension funds to maximize the benefits of their exemptions than it
would have been by allowing other tax-exempt organizations to do
the same. 8
Although the Treasury did not oppose the exception enacted
in 1980, it insisted on several safeguards in order to prevent a
recurrence of the exploitation of debt-financing that existed prior
to 1969. The Treasury Department proposed that the purchase
price for an exempt leveraged real estate acquisition be fixed in
advance, that the price be subject to adjustment only on the basis
of limited post-closing contingencies, that the contract not provide
for contingent repayments of acquisition indebtedness, that it pro-
hibit debt-financed acquisitions of property leased back to the ven-
dor, that it impose restrictions on the use of nonrecourse financing
when taken back by the vendor of the property, and that there be
restrictions on acquisitions of real estate by a qualified plan from
certain parties related to the plan, such as an employer. With
minimal changes, these restrictions were included in section
66. Five Misc. Tax Bills, supra note 61, at 296.
67. Id. at 298. In fact, exempt organizations, when subjected to tax under I.R.C. §
514, were at a disadvantage compared to taxable entities. Exempt organizations were lim-
ited to straight line depreciation under section 514, while taxable entities could use acceler-
ated depreciation. Thus, exempt entities could be taxed at a higher rate than taxable enti-
ties when they acquired debt-financed property.
68. Id. This distinction between pension funds and other exempt organizations seems
sound if the purpose of section 514 is to prevent organizations from growing from within
and thereby make them dependent on donors and members. This distinction does not seem
meaningful if the purpose of section 514 is to prevent transactions that are viewed as
abusive.
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514(c)(9) of the Code in 1980.69
E. The Deficit Reduction Act of 1984
Following enactment of the exception for pension funds, legis-
lation was introduced to extend the exception to schools.7 0 Testify-
ing on Senate bill 2498 in 1982, the Treasury Department op-
posed the extension. 1 It stated that the tax on debt-financed
income was useful in preventing the creation of unintended bene-
fits from tax-exempt status (such as the transfer of the benefit of
tax exemption to taxable parties through partnerships employing
69. I.R.C. § 514(c)(9), as enacted in 1980, states:
(9) REAL PROPERTY ACQUIRED BY QUALIFIED TRUST. -For purposes of this sec-
tion -
(A) IN GENERAL. - Except as provided in subparagraph (B), the term "ac-
quisition indebtedness" does not include indebtedness incurred by a qualified
trust in acquiring or improving any real property.
(B) EXCEPTIONS. - The provisions of subparagraph (A) shall not apply in
any case in which -
(i) the acquisition price is not a fixed amount determined as of the date of
acquisition;
(ii) the amount of any indebtedness or any other amount payable with re-
spect to such indebtedness, or the time for making any payment of any such
amount, is dependent, in whole or in part, upon any revenue, income, or profits
derived from such real property;
(iii) the real property is at any time after the acquisition leased by the qual-
ified trust to the person selling such property to such trust or to any person who
bears a relationship described in section 267(b) to such person;
(iv) the real property is acquired from, or is at any time after the acquisi-
tion leased by the qualified trust to, any person who -
(I) bears a relationship which is described in section 4975(e)(2)(C),(E), or
(G) to any plan with respect to which such trust was formed, or
(II) bears a relationship which is described in section 4975(e)(2)(F) or (H)
to any person described in subclause (I); or
(v) any person described in clause (iii) or (iv) provides the qualified trust
with nonrecourse financing in connection with such transaction and such debt
(I) is subordinate to any other indebtedness on such property, or
(11) bears interest at a rate which is significantly less than the rate available
from any person not described in clause (iii) or (iv) at the time such indebted-
ness is incurred.
(C) QUALIFIED TRUST. - For purposes of this paragraph, the term "quali-
fied trust" means any trust which constitutes a qualified trust under section 401.
Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-605, § 110, 94 Stat. 3521, 3525-26.
70. S. 2498, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982).
71. 1981-82 Miscellaneous Tax Bills, XVI: Hearing on S. 2498 Before the Sub-
comm. on Taxation and Debt Management of the Senate Finance Comm., 97th Cong., 2d
Sess. 53 (1982)(statement of William McKee, Tax Legislative Counsel, Department of the
Treasury).
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special allocations) .72 It defended the exception for pension funds
on the grounds that the exemptions for pensions and schools have
different purposes, and that the exemption for pensions results in
tax deferral while the exemption for schools often results in a per-
manent exemption." On the other hand, the Treasury found no
basis for differentiating between schools and other organizations
exempt under section 501(c)(3) which would continue to be fully
subject to the tax on debt-financed property, and opposed "piece-
meal" repeal of the provision. 4
A year later, the Treasury Department testified in opposition
to a similar bill.7 5 It emphasized the importance of section 514 as
an anti-abuse provision, 7 and objected to the bill because it would
have permitted a buyer to use nonrecourse financing provided by a
seller of property so long as the financing was not subordinate to
other debt on the property and the rate of interest was comparable
to the market rate. The Treasury Department believed that the
bill would enable sellers to convert ordinary income to capital
gain. The Treasury was also concerned that the exempt organiza-
tion would, be able to pay an inflated price for the property based
on the exempt organization's ability to receive rental income tax-
free. 7 It stated further that the possibilities for transferring tax
benefits from tax-exempt to taxable partners through partnership
allocations were so varied that it was doubtful that rules could be
drafted to prevent allocations of this sort.78 Finally, it observed
that the bill would give tax-exempt educational institutions an in-
centive to solicit gifts of real estate tax shelters which had passed
the "cross-over" point at which the taxable income exceeded the
cash flow produced, thus providing further tax advantages to the
taxable investors.79 The Treasury opposed the exception for pen-
72. Id. at 54.
73. Id. at 55. The latter difference is questionable. If a school uses its investment
income to acquire goods or services from taxable persons, the income will become subject
to tax in the hands of such persons. Moreover, taxation of pension income may be deferred
for forty years.
74. Id.
75. S. 1183, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983). For the text of Senate bill 1183 see 5
1983-84 Misc. Tax Bills: on S. 927, S. 1183 and H.R. 2163: Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on Taxation and Debt Management of the Senate Finance Comm., 98th Cong., 1st
Sess. 31-34 (1983) (statement of Robert G. Woodward, Acting Tax Legislative Counsel,
Department of the Treasury) [hereinafter 1983-84 Hearings].
76. 1983-84 Hearings, supra note 75, at 86-87.
77. Id. at 88.
78. Id. at 89.
79. This concern does not appear to have been well founded. In most cases the tax
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sions and reiterated the concern that if the exception were ex-
tended to schools there would be no principled basis for denying
the same exception to other section 501(c)(3) organizations, and
perhaps to other tax-exempt organizations as well. s0 Further, it
warned that expansion of the exception for investments in real es-
tate might lead to exceptions for investments in other types of
property. 81
Congress was unpersuaded by Treasury's strenuous objection
to the piecemeal repeal of section 514, and in 1984 it extended the
exception for debt-financed real property to schools.8 2 Congress
did, however, respond in part to Treasury's concern over potential
abuses. It added two further requirements which pension funds
and schools must meet in order to qualify for the exception to the
debt-financed property rules. First, no part of the financing could
be provided by the seller.8 3 Second, if the pension fund or school
was a partner in a partnership that acquired the debt-financed
property, it qualified for the exception only if all of the partners in
the partnership were "qualified organizations" (i.e., pension funds
or schools) or if each allocation to a partner which was a qualified
organization constituted a qualified allocation. 4 An organization
was treated as a qualified organization under these requirements
only if none of its income was unrelated business taxable in-
come.85 Generally, an allocation was treated as a qualified alloca-
tion if it met the rules governing partnerships under the tax-ex-
empt leasing provisions.86 Thus, a qualified allocation was an
cost to the donor of a charitable contribution of such a tax shelter would exceed the tax
benefits. See 2 W. MCKEE, W. NELSON & R. WHITMIRE, FEDERAL TAXATION OF PART-
NERSHIPS AND PARTNERS 1 18.02(6) (1977).
80. 1983-84 Hearings, supra note 75, at 89.
81. Id. This prediction proved correct. Later that year, a bill was introduced that
provided an exception for investments in limited partnerships which used debt financing to
purchase working interests in oil and gas. S. 1549, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983). For the
text of Senate bill 1549 see 4 1983-84 Misc. Tax Bills: Hearings on S. 108, S. 1464, S.
1549, S. 1579 and S. 1600 Before the Subcomm. on Taxation and Debt Management of
the Senate Finance Comm., 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 17-23 (1983).
82. Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 114, 98 Stat. 494, 496
(codified at I.R.C. § 514(c)(9)(c)(i) (1986)). A "school" is defined as an educational or-
ganization which normally maintains a regular faculty and curriculum and normally has a
regularly enrolled body of pupils or students in attendance at the place where its educa-
tional activities are regularly carried on." I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(A)(ii) (1986).
83. I.R.C. § 514(c)(9)(B)(v) (1986).
84. I.R.C. § 514(c)(9)(B)(vi) (1986).
85. Id.
86. I.R.C. § 514(c)(9)(B)(vi)(II) (1986)(referring to I.R.C. § 168(h)(6) (1986)).
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allocation under which: (1) the qualified organization was allo-
cated the same percentage share of each item of partnership in-
come, gain, loss, deduction, credit, and basis (excluding alloca-
tions with respect to contributed property); (2) that share
remained the same during the entire period that the organization
was a partner; and (3) the allocation had a substantial economic
effect, as defined under the rules applicable to partnership alloca-
tions generally.8 7 In addition, the Treasury was authorized to pre-
scribe regulations concerning the effect of guaranteed payments. 88
F. The Tax Reform Act of 1986
In 1986, Congress added section 501(c)(25) to the Code
which granted tax-exempt status to certain real estate title hold-
ing companies,89 and Congress extended to these organizations the
exception from the debt-financed property rules for real prop-
ertyY0 Congress thereby indirectly extended the exception to all
organizations that could hold an interest in a section 501(c)(25)
organization, including all section 501(c)(3) organizations. Stat-
ing that the pre-1986 rules made an untenable distinction between
educational organizations and other section 501(c)(3) organiza-
tions, the Treasury Department did not object to this extension of
87. I.R.C. § 704(b)(2) (1986).
88. I.R.C. § 707(c) (1986). The conference agreement stated that, under the Trea-
sury regulations, priority cash distributions to partners that constituted guaranteed pay-
ments should not disqualify an otherwise qualified allocation so long as the priority cash
distributions were reasonable in amount (e.g., equal to the most appropriate federal rate)
and were made to all partners in proportion to their capital in the partnership. The confer-
ees recognized that partnerships might try to avoid the qualified allocation rules by making
large guaranteed payments to tax-exempt partners for their use as capital. The conferees
expected the Treasury Department to promulgate regulations which would combat this
practice. H.R. REP. No. 861, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws 697.
89. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1603(a), 100 Stat. 2085, 2768
(codified at I.R.C. § 501(c) (1986)). Section 501(c)(25) provides tax-exempt status to a
corporation which acquires real property and remits the entire amount of income from that
property (less expenses) to one or more of the following organizations: a qualified pension,
profit-sharing, or stock bonus plan that meets the requirements of I.R.C. § 401(a); a gov-
ernmental plan (within the meaning of I.R.C. § 414(d)); the United States, any state or
political subdivision thereof, or any agency or instrumentality of the foregoing; and any
organization described in I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). A section 501(c)(25) organization can have
no more than 35 shareholders or beneficiaries and only one class of stock. Further, the
organization's shareholders or beneficiaries must have certain specified rights over the in-
vestment advisor and the right to withdraw from the corporation or trust.
90. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1603(b), 100 Stat. 2085, 2768-
69 (codified at I.R.C. § 514 (1986)).
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the exception.91 It also noted that the exception's potential for cre-
ating unintended benefits had been reduced by the .1984
amendments.9
In addition to broadening the scope of section 514(c)(9), the
Tax Reform Act of 1986 also liberalized the rules governing part-
nership allocations. 93 The new rules permitted a qualified organi-
zation that was a partner in a partnership that held debt-financed
real property to qualify for the exception, assuming it met the
other requirements, if it met the "tax avoidance test." An alloca-
tion (other than a qualified allocation to a qualified organization)
would fail this test if its principal purpose was the avoidance of
income tax. The House Report cited as an example of a permissi-
ble allocation a partnership that elected forty-year straight-line
depreciation on leased real estate but failed to meet the qualified
allocation rule because an increased share of a loss or deduction
was allocated to the exempt organization in order to meet the sub-
stantial economic effect requirement of section 704(b)(2). 4
G. The Revenue Act of 1987
Section 514(c)(9) was amended again by The Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987. This Act replaced the tax
avoidance test with an exception to the qualified allocation rule
for certain disproportionate allocations.9 5 Under the changes made
by the 1987 Act, a disproportionate allocation was permitted if
throughout the entire period that a qualified organization was a
partner in the partnership: (1) no distributive share of overall
partnership loss allocable to a partner other than a qualified or-
ganization could exceed such partner's smallest distributive share
of overall partnership income for any taxable year; (2) no distrib-
utive share of overall partnership income allocable to a qualified
organization could exceed such partner's smallest distributive
share of overall partnership loss for any taxable year; and (3) each
91. Miscellaneous Tax Bills, 1986: Hearing on H.R. 3301 Before the Subcomm. on
Select Revenue Measures of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 99th Cong., 2d Sess.
187, 190 (1986)(statement of Richard D'Avino, Acting Deputy Tax Legislative Counsel,
Department of the Treasury).
92. Id.
93. Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1878(e)(3), 100 Stat. 2085, 2903-04 (codified at I.R.C. §
514 (1986)).
94. H.R. REP. No. 426, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 1035 (1985).
95. Revenue Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, § 10,214, 101 Stat. 1330, 1330-407
to 1330-408 (1987)(codified at I.R.C. § 514 (1988)).
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partnership allocation had substantial economic effect within the
meaning of section 704(b).96 The first two prongs of the test are
called the "fractions rule"; the third is referred to as the "substan-
tial economic effect test."
The conference report gave an example of an allocation that
was prohibited by the fractions rule.97 In the example, a partner-
ship that held debt-financed real property was formed by a taxa-
ble partner and a qualified organization. 8 Overall partnership in-
come and loss was allocated as follows:
Qualified Taxable
Organization Partner
Years 1-5
Income: 60% 40%
Loss: 80% 20 %
Years 6-10
Income: 40% 60%
Loss: 20% 80%
The conference report stated that the example failed the fractions
rule because of the mismatch between loss and income allocated
to the qualified organization in various years. Specifically, the
qualified organization's smallest share of loss was twenty percent,
and this was exceeded by the allocation to it of sixty percent (in
years one through five) and forty percent (in years six through
ten) of the overall partnership income.9 The largest share of in-
come that could be allocated to the tax-exempt partner under the
fractions rule was twenty percent. Any portion from zero to
twenty percent could be allocated to it. Similarly, the largest
share, of loss that could be allocated to the taxable partner was
forty percent (corresponding to his smallest share of overall part-
nership income).
96. Id. Under section 704(b), a partner's distributive share of income, gain, loss,
deduction, or credit is determined in accordance with the partner's interest in the partner-
ship (determined by taking into account all facts and circumstances) if the allocation to a
partner under the partnership agreement does not have substantial economic effect. I.R.C.
§ 704(b) (1986). See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2) for the definition of substantial economic
effect.
97. H.R. REP. No. 495, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 956, reprinted in 1987 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2313-1702.
98. Id.
99. Id.
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H. The Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988
Just one year later, Congress again amended section
514(c)(9). The Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of
1988100 excluded section 501(c)(25) organizations from the excep-
tion for real property contained in section 514(c)(9). Under the
changes made by the 1986 Act, the exception is available only to
the extent that the shareholders or beneficiaries of the organiza-
tion would have been treated as qualified organizations prior to
the enactment of the 1986 Act.1"1 Thus, the 1988 Act repealed
the 1986 Act's extension of the section 514(c)(9) exception, and
again restricted the exception to pension trusts and schools.
The 1988 Act also amended the disproportionate allocation
rule. It deleted the limitation under the fractions rule on the share
of loss that could be allocated to a partner that is not a qualified
organization, but retained the limitation on the share of gain that
can be allocated to a qualified organization.0 2 The House report
explained that the objectives of the fractions rule - limiting the
allocation of income to qualified tax-exempt partners in excess of
their smallest share of loss and limiting the allocation of loss to
other partners in excess of their smallest share of income - could
be accomplished by either part of the rule standing alone."0 3 The
deletion of the first part of the fractions rule leaves unchanged the
limitation on allocations of either overall partnership loss or over-
all partnership income as between qualified organization partners
as a group and other partners as a group.10 4 It does, however, re-
move the limitation on allocations exclusively between partners
that are not qualified organizations. 0 5
In addition, the 1988 Act provided that the Treasury Depart-
ment shall prescribe regulations necessary to carry out the pur-
pose of section 514(c)(9).10 " The House report indicated that this
regulatory authority was provided because the fractions rule of
section 514(c)(9) and the substantial economic effect rule of sec-
tion 704(b) lead to inconsistent outcomes in some cases.'10 The
100. Pub. L. No. 100-647, 1988 US. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (102 Stat.)
3342.
101. Id. § 1016, 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (102 Stat.) at 3573-75.
102. Id. § 2004(h), 1988 US. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (102 Stat.) at 3603.
103. H.R. REP. No. 795, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 405 (1988).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 404.
107. Id.
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report directed the Treasury to resolve conflicts in a manner that
would carry out the congressional purpose of limiting the transfer
of tax benefits from tax-exempt partners to taxable partners.10
I. Congressional Hearings
The debt-financed property rules remain in a state of flux. In
the 1988 Act, Congress delegated the task of resolving the issue of
partnership allocations to the Treasury Department. Further, the
Oversight Subcommittee of the House Committee on Ways and
Means set forth for public comment a proposal to limit the section
514(c) (9) exception to qualified organizations that made at least a
twenty percent equity investment in the property. The Subcom-
mittee also requested public comment on a proposal that debt-fi-
nanced income received from all pass-through entities should re-
tain its character.1 09 These proposals were not, however, contained
in subsequent draft recommendations submitted by the chairman
to the members of the Subcommittee. " The most recent draft
recommendations, if adopted, would instead require that the Trea-
sury Department and the Internal Revenue Service study and re-
port to the congressional tax-writing committees on the scope and
continued justification of the present exclusions from the unre-
lated business income tax, including the exclusions for debt-fi-
nanced income received by certain organizations."
II. EXAMINATION OF THE POLICY RATIONALES
A. Overview
Charitable organizations are funded through a variety of
sources, including donations, membership dues, government
108. Id.
109. Press Release No. 16, Subcomm. on Oversight, Comm. on Ways and Means,
U.S. House of Representatives (March 31, 1988).
The press release set forth "discussion options" which were the result of hearings held
by the Subcommittee. The hearings focused on the unrelated business income tax, in par-
ticular, and the taxation of the income-producing activities of exempt organizations, in
general. They lasted five days, spanning June 22-26, 1988. Unrelated Business Income
Tax: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the Comm. on Ways and Means,
100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987)[hereinafter Unrelated Business Income Tax].
110. These draft recommendations were not officially released to the public by the
Subcommittee and were apparently intended only for internal use by the Subcommitee.
Nevertheless, copies were obtained by the press. DAILY EXECUTIVE REP. (BNA) (June 24,
1988).
i111 Id. at L-27.
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grants, fees for services, profits from related businesses, tax-free
investment income, and taxable income from debt-financed prop-
erty and unrelated businesses. Historically, when an organization
was granted an exemption from federal income tax, all sources of
its income were exempt and viewed as an appropriate means of
financing the organization's activities, so long as exempting the
income source did not have some undesirable collateral effect.
Thus, unrelated businesses are taxed because Congress concluded
that tax exemption for such businesses resulted in an "unfair"
competitive edge for the exempt organizations over their taxable
counterparts. 12 In addition to "unfair" competition, Congress was
also concerned that these unrelated businesses distracted exempt
organizations from their exempt purposes. 1" 3 Passive income, how-
ever, was not viewed as a source of unfair competition. Thus, it
was not taxed.
When passive income was earned from debt-financed prop-
erty, however, it was subjected to tax. The historical record is un-
clear as to whether the taxation of debt-financed property was
adopted as an anti-abuse measure or was instead intended to en-
sure that charitable organizations were reliant upon, and account-
able to, the public. The current statute is a hybrid which serves
both purposes. On the one hand, with respect to real property held
by schools and qualified pension plans, the statute functions as an
anti-abuse measure. If the requirements of section 514(c)(9)(B),
which are designed to prevent the creation of unintended benefits,
are satisfied, then income from debt-financed real property held
by such organizations is not taxed because it meets the exception
to the general debt-financed property rule. On the other hand,
with respect to real property held by organizations other than
schools and qualified pension plans (and personal property held by
any exempt organization) the statute functions to generally dis-
courage debt-financing, without regard to the potential for abuse.
Thus, with respect to these situations, the statute arguably reflects
a congressional judgment that debt-financed property is an unde-
sirable asset for exempt organizations.
This part of the Article examines, first, the policy for exclud-
ing passive income from tax; second, the need for accountability
and whether the debt-financed property rules are an effective
means of achieving accountability; third, whether section
112. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
113. See infra note 116 and accompanying text.
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514(c)(9) is adequate to prevent exempt organizations from mis-
using their exempt status; and fourth, whether section 514(c)(9)
should be extended to other organizations and other types of
property.
B. The Exclusion for Passive Income
The taxation of debt-financed property operates as a limita-
tion on the otherwise exempt status of passive investment income.
Although the passive income exemption is not entirely without its
critics, 114 it has been supported on a number of grounds. In 1950,
Congress supported excluding passive income from the tax on un-
related business income on the ground that passive income was
not likely to result in- serious competition for taxable businesses. 1 5
It has also been supported on the ground that it appropriately en-
courages exempt organizations to limit their level of participation
in income-producing activities to passive investments, which are
seen as less of a distraction from the organization's exempt pur-
poses than is active participation in business enterprises.," The
passive income exception also assists charitable organizations in
gaining some degree of independence, and gives them the ability
to weather unforeseen events in lean economic times.117 Finally,
an argument can be made that the passive income exclusion is a
logical extension of the charitable contribution deduction, which
allows corporate taxpayers a deduction for donations to charity. 8
An analysis of the soundness of these arguments is beyond
the scope of this Article. Suffice it to say, that the passive income
exclusion for charitable organizations appears - at least for the
moment - to be well accepted. Neither Congress nor the Trea-
sury has seriously questioned the exclusion for passive income for
114. See, e.g., Break & Pechman, Relationship Between the Corporation and Indi-
vidual Income Taxes, 28 NAT'L TAX J. 341, 344 (1975).
115. See supra notes 15-19 and accompanying text.
116. Unrelated Business Income Tax, supra note 109, at 46. See also COMM. ON
WAYS AND MEANS, 89TH CONG., lST SEss.. TREASURY DEPT'S REPORT ON PRIVATE FOUN-
DATIONS 34-35 (Comm. Print 1965).
117. See Break & Pechman, supra note 114, at 344.
118. Although subject to numerous restrictions and qualifications, section 170 gener-
ally allows taxpayers a deduction for donations to charity. If charitable organizations were
subject to tax on investment income, presumably they also would be allowed a charitable
deduction. Since a charitable organization's income is required by law to be irrevocably
committed to charitable purposes, the only question would be the timing and the amount of
the deduction.
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these organizations. 119 Congress has focused on the debt-financed
property rules, which it has reviewed and amended numerous
times in the 1980s, without any suggestion that the underlying
exclusion for passive income is not justified. Moreover, in testi-
mony before Congress in 1987, the Treasury Department affirma-
tively supported the passive income exclusion for charitable orga-
nizations.120  Finally, the Ways and Means Oversight
Subcommittee has not questioned the fundamental policy of the
exemption for passive income of charitable organizations. 2'
C. Accountability
1. Overview
Congress has never expressly embraced the Treasury Depart-
ment's argument that income from debt-financed property should
119. The Treasury Department and the Oversight Subcommittee of the House Com-
mittee on Ways and Means have periodically questioned the operation of the exclusion. For
example, they have questioned whether the royalty exclusion should be available for
amounts determined on the basis of taxable income. Also, they have questioned the opera-
tion of rules under section 512(b)(13) dealing with passive income received from controlled
corporations. See Unrelated Business Income Tax, supra note 109, at 18, 48 (statement of
0. Donaldson Chapoton, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Department of the Treasury); Press
Release No. 25, Comm. on Ways and Means, U.S. House of Representatives (June 17,
1987), reprinted in Unrelated Business Income Tax, supra note 109, at 2-4.
Excise taxes are imposed on the investment income of private foundations. I.R.C. §
4940 (1986). Congress has considered imposing excise taxes on other exempt organizations
as well, even though they act as a limitation on the passive income exclusion. The rationale
for an excise tax on the investment income of private foundations is unrelated to the policy
for exempting passive income. The only purpose of the excise tax was to ensure that private
foundations bore the cost inherent in administering the complex rules which restrict the
activities of private foundations (added in 1969). See H.R. REP. No. 413, 91st Cong., 1st
Sess., reprinted in 1969 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1645, 1663; S. REP. No. 552,
91st Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1969 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2027, 2053.
In 1987, the Joint Committee on Taxation recommended an excise tax on the invest-
ment income of exempt organizations in its list of revenue options submitted to Congress.
The policy reason underlying the proposal was influenced, in part, by the existence of a
large federal budget deficit. The Committee further reasoned that tax-exempt organiza-
tions ought to share in the cost of government because they benefit from their tax-exempt
status and because they enjoy access to a multitude of government services. See JOINT
COMM. ON TAXATION, 100TH CONG., IST SESs., DESCRIPTION OF POSSIBLE OPTIONS TO IN-
CREASE REVENUES PREPARED FOR THE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS 275-76 (Comm. Print
1987). In the context of charitable organizations, the passive income exclusion for organi-
zations exempt under sections other than section 501(c)(3), such as social welfare organi-
zations (section 501(c)(4)), labor unions (section 501(c)(5)), and trade associations (sec-
tion 501(c)(6)) has been questioned by the Treasury and Congressional staff.
120. Unrelated Business Income Tax, supra note 109, at 18, 46.
121. See Press Release No. 16, supra note 109; DAILY EXECUTIVE REP. (BNA)
(June 24, 1988).
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be taxed so that charities will seek growth through public support
instead of leveraged investments.'22 Nevertheless, Congress did
enact legislation in 1969 that taxed all income from debt-financed
property without regard to whether the transaction presented any
potential for abuse. The reasons for this movement toward the
Treasury Department position have never been altogether clear.
Recognizing that the 1950 business lease provision had failed to
terminate the problems represented by sale and lease-back trans-
actions, perhaps Congress passed the broader provision in 1969
because it concluded that a narrow statute could not successfully
end abusive transactions. Alternatively, there may have been some
agreement in the Congress with the Treasury Department's views
that is not reflected in the legislative record. Whatever Congress'
intent may have been in 1969, given the confused state of the law
today and the fact that the Treasury's arguments are the only
views ever articulated as justification for taxing all debt-financed
income, 12 a fresh look at these arguments is now appropriate.
The Treasury Department's argument that debt-financed in-
vestment income should be taxed to encourage charitable organi-
zations to be dependent upon the public for financial support is
premised on the theory that such dependency ensures accountabil-
ity to the public. 24 That exempt organizations should be account-
able to the public seems clear beyond peradventure. If one accepts
the proposition that tax exemption (and the eligibility to receive
tax deductible charitable donations) is a valuable benefit that is
granted to charitable organizations because they serve a public
rather than a private purpose, it follows that the government has a
duty to ensure that such organizations are in fact serving the pub-
lic. Yet, assessing accountability is difficult due to definitional
problems, and due to the immense size of the charitable sector.
Moreover, the formal procedures at the federal level for ensuring
accountability are limited. Each of these issues will be discussed
in turn.
122. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
123. The Treasury Department favors the application of a tax on all debt-financed
income. Such a tax is needed because any statute which allows a tax-free return on debt-
financed income is too prone to abuse. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
124. H.R. REP. No. 413, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 1, at 41, reprinted in 1969-3 C.B.
200, 227; S. REP. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 56-57, reprinted in 1969-3 C.B. 423, 460-
61 (support requirement in I.R.C. § 509 - which defines section 501(c)(3) organizations
that are not private foundations, and thus are public charities - is designed to ensure that
public charities are responsive to the needs of the public).
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2. Definition of Charitable Organization
Section 501(c)(3) currently grants tax exemption to a broad
and diverse group of organizations. Specifically, section 501(c)(3)
exempts from tax "[c]orporations, and any community chest,
fund, or foundation, organized and operated exclusively for reli-
gious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or
educational purposes, or to foster national or international ama-
teur sports competition .... or for the prevention of cruelty to
children or animals .. Treasury regulations provide that
"[t]he term charitable is used in section 501(c)(3) in its generally
accepted legal sense and is, therefore, not to be construed as lim-
ited by the separate enumeration in section 501(c) (3) of other tax-
exempt purposes which may fall within the broad outlines of
'charity' as developed by judicial decisions."12 6 The regulations
further provide that the term "charitable" includes: "[r]elief of
the poor and distressed or of the underprivileged; advancement of
religion; advancement of education or science; erection or mainte-
nance of public buildings, monuments, or works; lessening the
burdens of Government; and promotion of social welfare by orga-
nizations designed to accomplish any of the above purposes, or (i)
to lessen neighborhood tensions; (ii) to eliminate prejudice and
discrimination; (iii) to defend human and civil rights secured by
law; or (iv) to combat community deterioration and juvenile delin-
quency. ' 1 7 The only essential element to obtaining exemption
under section 501(c)(3) is that the organization serve a public
rather than a private purpose. 128
3. Size of the Charitable Sector
Currently, there are nearly 390,000 religious (excluding
churches), educational, charitable, and scientific organizations
listed in the IRS Master File as exempt under section
501(c)(3).1 12 The operating expenditures of exempt organizations
have been estimated to be six percent of the gross national prod-
125. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1986).
126. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-l(d)(2)(as amended in 1976).
127. Id.
128. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-l(d)(l)(ii)(as amended in 1976).
129. Unrelated Business Income Tax, supra note 109, at 26. The IRS Master File is
a compilation of those organizations that have applied to the Internal Revenue Service for
tax exemption and been granted tax exemption. Id. at 26 n.l.
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uct,130 and section 501(c)(3) organizations account for most of
this wealth.13' Total employment in the nonprofit sector (both
paid and volunteer) accounts for approximately ten percent of to-
tal hours worked in the United States economy. 1 2
4. Oversight by the Federal Government
Notwithstanding the breadth of the definition of "charitable
organization" and the size of the exempt sector, the only formal
oversight responsibility at the federal level is exercised by the In-
ternal Revenue Service in its capacity as the federal agency
charged with administering the tax laws. 3' The Service fulfills
this function through the exemption application process and sub-
sequent audits of information returns filed by exempt organiza-
tions. The Service's resources, however, are limited. In 1986,
slightly more than 400,000 exempt organization information re-
turns were filed, 3 4 and the Service audited approximately five
percent of them.3 5 Moreover, its primary enforcement tools are
the revocation of exempt status for organizations that extend their
activities beyond the scope of their exemption and the imposition
of the unrelated business income tax. At the federal level, there
are no rules designed to ensure that public charities act prudently
and in the public interest. No federal agency systematically re-
views the activities of exempt organizations. Similarly, no federal
agency evaluates whether the public is receiving a benefit that jus-
tifies the dollars foregone in tax revenues. At the federal level, this
task has been left instead to the public which is expected to dis-
charge this vital function by granting or withholding financial
support.
130. Id. at 26 (this figure is based on 1985 estimates by the Bureau of Economic
Affairs).
131. UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, COMPETITION BETWEEN TAX-
ABLE BUSINESSES AND TAx-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS (GAO/GGD-87-40 BR) 15 (1987).
132. Id.
133. State governments exercise jurisdiction over charitable organizations in matters
that do not involve the federal income tax exemption.
134. Unrelated Business Income Tax, supra note 109, at 70 (statement of Lawrence
B. Gibbs, Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service). An additional 500,000 exempt
-organizations avoided the filing requirement because they were churches or because they
did not have more than $25,000 in gross receipts. Id.
135. Id.
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5. The Debt-Financed Property Rules as a Means of Ensuring
Accountability
Given the broad definition of charitable organizations, the
very limited resources the government devotes to monitoring these
organizations, and the significant size of the charitable sector,
concern about accountability is justified. It is not at all clear, how-
ever, that taxing debt-financed income is an effective means of en-
suring that charitable organizations are accountable to the public
for the benefits of tax-exempt status.
The debt-financed property rules are a very indirect means of
encouraging reliance on public support. The rules may slow the
accumulation of wealth by charitable organizations, but they do
not prohibit the accumulation of wealth. To the extent that the
debt-financed property rules do make charitable organizations
more reliant on public support, they may help to ensure accounta-
bility in a very broad sense. The public, by selecting the organiza-
tions it will support through contributions and membership dues,
directs the benefit of the federal tax exemption to those activities
it considers most valuable. It is questionable, however, whether
dependence on public support leads to meaningful public scrutiny.
One would suspect that many small donors to large charitable or-
ganizations have little knowledge of the organization's specific ac-
tivities and operations.
Not only are the debt-financed property rules an extremely
indirect and ineffective means of ensuring accountability, they are
also unnecessary because the private foundation rules136 perform
this task. Enacted in 1969, the same year the debt-financed prop-
erty rules were enacted, these rules impose stringent requirements
designed to ensure the accountability of all charitable organiza-
tions that lack public support. All section 501(c)(3) organizations
are classified as private foundations unless they satisfy one of
three tests. Each of the three tests is intended to require a certain
degree of public support and involvement.
First, "public institutions" are excepted from classification as
private foundations. Included in this category are churches,
schools, hospitals, certain organizations providing support for pub-
lic colleges and universities, and governmental units (i.e., a state,
possession of the United States, or the District of Columbia).'
136. See I.R.C. §§ 509, 4940-4946 (1986).
137. I.R.C. § 509(a)(1) (1986). Churches and schools are inherently dependent on
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Second, publicly supported organizations are not private
foundations. Publicly supported organizations include any organi-
zation that normally receives: (1) more than one-third of its sup-
port in each taxable year from any combination of gifts, grants,
contributions, or membership fees, and gross receipts from admis-
sions, sales of merchandise, performance of services, or furnishing
of facilities in an activity that is not an unrelated trade or busi-
ness, excluding certain large receipts and receipts from disquali-
fied persons, and (2) no more than one-third of its support in each
taxable year from gross investment income and after-tax unre-
lated business taxable income."3 8
Third, "supporting organizations" are not private founda-
tions. Supporting organizations operate exclusively for the benefit
of, perform the functions of, or carry out the purposes of specified
public institutions or publicly supported organizations, and are op-
erated, supervised, or controlled by one or more such organiza-
tions and are not controlled by disqualified persons.13
Charitable organizations classified as private foundations are
subject to a series of rules intended to ensure that they are ac-
countable for their exempt status. 40 Specifically, they are subject
to rules that prohibit self-dealing with persons and entities closely
related to the foundation,1 41 rules that require distribution of a
minimum amount of income for charitable purposes each year,14 2
rules that prohibit large ownership interests in active businesses, 143
rules that restrict investments which jeopardize the organization's
charitable purpose,1 44 and rules that ensure that the foundation's
funds are expended for purposes that will serve a public rather
than a private purpose. 145 The private foundation rules appear to
have worked quite well to ensure that those organizations classi-
public support. If the public did not have a need for these services, the institutions would
have no purpose. By contrast, because less choice is involved in using hospitals, it is not so
clear that public support is inherently a part of the operation of a hospital.
138. I.R.C. § 509(a)(2) (1986).
139. I.R.C. § 509(a)(3) (1986).
140. See generally I.R.C. §§ 4941-4946 (1986).
141. I.R.C. § 4941 (1986).
142. I.R.C. § 4942 (1986).
143. I.R.C. § 4943 (1986).
144. I.R.C. § 4944 (1986). An investment may jeopardize the organization's purpose
if the managers have failed to exercise ordinary business care and prudence in providing
for the short and long-term financial needs of the foundation to carry on its exempt pur-
pose. Treas. Reg. § 53.4944-1(a)(2) (as amended in 1973).
145. I.R.C. § 4945 (1986).
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fled as private foundations are accountable for their exempt
status.46
If there is a concern that other charitable organizations are
not serving the public interest, that concern should be expressly
addresged and rules directed to specific problems should be devel-
'oped. The taxation of income from debt-financed property cannot
be 6xpected to achieve accountability to the public and should not
be defended on the grounds that it does achieve this goal.
D. Section 514 as an Anti-Abuse Measure
1. Overview
The debt-financed property rules were enacted to solve the
problems that arose from sale and lease-back transactions.1,47 The
rules have been cited by the Treasury Department as necessary to
prevent charitable organizations from transferring the benefits of
their exemption to taxable persons through partnership alloca-
tions.145 The rules, however, were drafted broadly to tax income
from all debt-financed investment property.
The breadth of the debt-financed property rules might once
have been defended on the grounds that debt-financed investments
are not necessary to the achievement of any exempt purpose and
that it is difficult to draft a provision that is specifically targeted
at potential problems. Balancing the lack of any compelling need
for exempt organizations to acquire debt-financed property
against the difficulty of preventing potential problems through a
narrow provision, Congress might reasonably have concluded that
taxation of all debt-financed property was justified. The force of
this argument, however, has been dissipated by the enactment of
section 514(c)(9), which indicates that Congress believes a narrow
provision is adequate to prevent abuse. This section of the Article
examines the effect of borrowing by exempt organizations, and the
effect of section 514(c)(9) on sale and lease-back transactions and
146. In 1983 and 1984, the Subcommittee on Oversight of the Committee on Ways
and Means conducted hearings to review the private foundation provisions. See Hearings
on Private Foundations Before the Subcomm. on Oversight, Comm. on Ways and Means,
98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983). The Subcommittee concluded that no significant changes
were needed. HOUSE SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT 98TH CONG., IST SESs., REPORT AND REC-
OMMENDATIONS CONCERNING FEDERAL TAX RULES GOVERNING PRIVATE FOUNDATIONS
42-43 (Comm. Print 1983).
147. See supra notes 20-33 and accompanying text.
148. See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
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partnership allocations.
2. The Effect of Borrowing by Charitable Organizations
Taxation of all income from debt-financed investment prop-
erty would be desirable if borrowing would give tax-exempt inves-
tors an advantage over taxable investors that would enable tax-
exempt investors to pay a higher price for an asset or to acquire
property without risking any of its own funds. No such advantage
results from the mere act of borrowing. For both a tax-exempt
and a taxable investor, the advantage of borrowing arises as a re-
sult of the difference between the interest paid on the loan and the
profit earned on the investment. Thus, if an investor borrows at an
interest rate of ten percent to acquire an investment that yields a
return of twelve percent, his net profit arises from the two percent
difference. If a charitable organization was tax-exempt on such an
investment, it would not obtain any advantage that is not inherent
in the tax exemption for passive investment income. Thus, unless
one is to argue that the passive income exception itself gives rise
to potential problems, there is no reason to argue that investment
income should be taxed solely because it is acquired with bor-
rowed funds.
An advantage would accrue to the charity if it could obtain a
more favorable rate of interest than a taxable investor. It is not
known whether charities obtain more favorable interest rates from
commercial lenders than do taxable investors. One obvious, but
limited, source of more favorable interest rates for charities is the
tax-exempt bond market. Although tax-exempt bonds may not be
used to acquire investments, this restriction only prohibits "direct"
use of tax-exempt bonds for investments. A charity may "indi-
rectly" use tax-exempt bonds to finance investments when it uses
the bonds to borrow for an exempt purpose that it could have fi-
nanced out of proceeds from the sale 6f investiientg.,Although
this potentiar for advantage exists, the taxation of debt-financed
property has no impact on it because the advantage arises from
the ability to obtain a lower rate of interest and not from the ex-
empt status of the income.
Because interest is generally a deductible expense, the tax
system may actually provide taxable investors with a competitive
advantage over tax-exempt investors in some circumstances. If a
taxable investor is able to obtain a tax benefit from the deduction
of interest that is greater than the tax cost associated with the
income from the debt-financed property, then. it would have an
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advantage over a tax-exempt investor that is not taxed on the
leveraged income but also is not allowed a deduction for interest
paid on the indebtedness incurred in acquiring the investment.
Numerous rules in the tax law are designed to preclude taxable
investors from obtaining this advantage. 149
3. Sale and Lease-Back Transactions
The advantage that charities obtained over taxable investors
through sale and lease-back transactions arose not from the com-
bination of tax-exempt income and borrowing alone, but was de-
pendent upon the existence of a number of other factors as well.
These included "rents" that were stated as a percentage of profits,
borrowing that was nonrecourse, financing provided by the seller
of the property, and repayment of the borrowing solely out of the
profits of the acquired property. Because the charity was not per-
sonally liable for the loan and the loan was repaid solely out of
profits, the charity was not required to risk its own funds. Because
it was not paying for the property out of its own funds, it is rea-
sonable to assume that the charity would pay whatever price the
"seller" demanded so long as the price was not higher than the
price demanded by other sellers. 150
The conditions imposed by section 514(c)(9) as prerequisites
to avoiding taxation of income from debt-financed property appear
to render these benefits of the pre-1969 sale and lease-back trans-
action unattainable. Specifically, section 514(c)(9) requires: that
the price be a fixed amount; that the time and amount of pay-
ments on the debt not be dependent upon revenue, income, or
profits derived from the property; that the real property cannot be
leased to, or its acquisition financed by, the seller or to any person
related to the seller; that the real property cannot be leased to, or
its acquisition financed by, persons bearing certain relationships to
a pension fund that holds the real property; and that g partnership
holding real property conform with certain restrictions on alloca-
tions among partners. 5' While taxing the income from debt-fi-
149. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 265(2) (1986)(no deduction allowed for interest expense in-
curred to generate tax-exempt interest income); I.R.C. § 163(d) (1986)(limiting the de-
ductibility of interest paid on investment indebtedness).
150. Some authors have questioned whether Congress was correct in its assumption
that charitable organizations paid a price in excess of fair market value in sale and lease-
back transactions. See, e.g., Hall, supra note 28, at 343.
151. I.R.C. § 514(c)(9) (1986).
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nanced property also removes a critical element from the sale and
lease-back transaction and renders its benefits unattainable, it is a
broader remedy than necessary to cure the problem of the sale
and lease-back transaction.
4. Partnership Allocations
In a partnership, the potential for the benefits of tax exemp-
tion to taxable persons arises from the partnership's ability to allo-
cate items of profit, loss, income, and deduction among partners.
If the income from the partnership is not taxable to a tax-exempt
partner, the losses and deductions will be of no value to it. The
tax-exempt partner may be willing to agree to allocate such losses
and deductions to taxable partners, perhaps in exchange for a
higher percentage of income and profits. The fact that the part-
nership property is encumbered by debt increases the potential for
transferring the benefits of tax exemption because it creates
greater tax losses.152 Debt financing does not, however, create the
potential for transferring such benefits in the first instance.
Taxing income from debt-financed property only partially
eliminates the potential for transferring the benefits of tax exemp-
tion through partnership allocations. To the extent that a tax-ex-
empt partner is taxable, it is on a par with the non-exempt part-
ners. Accordingly, it will be unwilling to give up its share of the
deductions and losses. The debt-financed property rules, however,
fail to place exempt partners and non-exempt partners in the same
position because they subject the exempt partner to only partial
taxation. It is taxed only on that portion of its income that is debt-
financed while the non-exempt partner is fully taxable on its in-
come. Consequently, unless the property is 100 percent debt-fi-
nanced, the exempt partner's effective tax rate will still be lower
than that of the non-exempt partner. Therefore, any tax benefits
will still be less valuable to the exempt partner than to the non-
exempt partner. 153 Moreover, the debt-financed property rules im-
pose no restrictions on partnership allocations if the partnership
152. See Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1, 11 (1947)(ruling that an investor may
include the value of his property, unreduced by any mortgage, when computing his depre-
ciable basis).
153. The debt-financed property rules may have more force as a practical matter
than they have in theory. Because many charitable organizations seek to avoid any liability
for the unrelated business income tax, they may insist on an allocation that meets the
requirements of § 514(c)(9)(B)(vi) to avoid even a small tax.
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does not acquire debt-financed property. 54
If properly drafted, restrictions on partnership allocations (re-
gardless of whether the partnership property is debt-financed) are
a more effective means of preventing abuse than the taxation of
debt-financed property. The qualified allocation rules that were
added to section 514(c)(9) in 1984 were clearly sufficient to pre-
vent abuse in those partnerships that acquired debt-financed prop-
erty. These rules, however, were criticized as being inconsistent
with industry practices.155 Through the post-1984 amendments,
Congress has sought to develop restrictions that take into account
the conventional practices in the real estate industry and still pre-
vent the transferring of the benefits of tax exemption to taxable
partners. 156 To date, that objective has not been achieved.
5. Summary
The acquisition of property by an exempt organization with
borrowed funds does not necessarily give rise to any potential
problems, and does not give the exempt organization an advantage
over taxable persons that the organization does not also enjoy in
an unleveraged investment. Borrowing was but a single element in
the sale and lease-back transactions and partnership allocations
that Congress viewed as objectionable. The taxation of income
from debt-financed property is an indirect means of preventing
these objectionable transactions. In the case of sale and lease-
back transactions, the taxation of debt-financed property is an
over-broad response because the potential for abuse exists only
with certain types of borrowing. While one can never be certain
that any provision is adequate to prevent every conceivable prob-
lem, section 514(c)(9) appears sufficient to prevent the problems
that arise in sale and lease-back transactions.
In the case of partnership allocations, the taxation of income
from debt-financed property is too narrow a response. First, the
taxation of debt-financed property does not place the exempt part-
ner on a par with the taxable partner. Second, potential problems
arise not from borrowing, but from the ability to allocate items of
154. Section 704(b) and the extensive regulations thereunder require that partner-
ship allocations have substantial economic effect.
155. See Feder & Scharfstein, Leveraged Investment in Real Property Through
Partnerships by Tax Exempt Organizations After the Revenue Act of 1987 - A Lesson in
How the Legislative Process Should Not Work, 42 TAx LAw. 55 (1988).
156. Id.
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profit, loss, income, and deduction among the partners. The mag-
nitude of the problem is increased, but the problem is not created,
by the existence of borrowing. Congress should continue to focus
its efforts on developing restrictions on partnership allocations. In
addition, consideration should be given to extending the restric-
tions developed under section 514(c)(9) to all partnerships that
have tax-exempt and taxable partners.
E. Extension of the Section 514(c)(9) Exception
1. To Other Exempt Organizations
If the current provisions of section 514(c)(9) are sufficient to
prevent any abuse from arising through the acquisition of debt-
financed real property, 157 there is no policy reason for limiting the
benefits of those provisions to qualified pension plans and schools.
In the context of an anti-abuse measure, there is no difference
between pension plans and schools, on the one hand, and other
section 501(c)(3) organizations, on the other. Circumstances that
would give rise to objectionable transactions in the latter group
would have the same effect on transactions in the former group.1 58
Accordingly, if Congress views the debt-financed property rules as
an anti-abuse measure, it should extend the exception of section
514(c)(9) to all section 501(c)(3) organizations.
2. To Other Types of Property
Limiting the exception to the debt-financed property rules to
real property has been justified for two reasons. First, it has been
argued that debt-financing is the conventional means of acquiring
real estate and that, as a practical matter, exempt organizations
will be excluded from this market if they are taxed on debt-fi-
nanced income.1 59 Second, it was argued in 1980 that exempt or-
ganizations, when taxed under section 514, were taxed at a higher
157. This assumes that the regulations to be promulgated by the Treasury Depart-
ment under the authority of the 1988 Act will not allow charitable organizations to trans-
fer the benefits of exemption to taxable persons.
158. There is, however, a distinction between pension plans and schools with respect
to the issue of accountability. Pension plans owe a fiduciary duty to plan participants and
accountability to those participants is regulated under the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act. The notion of dependence on the public for support through donations and
membership fees has no relevance to pension plans.
159. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
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rate than taxable entities.160 If taxation of debt-financed income is
viewed as an anti-abuse measure, neither of these considerations is
significant. The fact that debt is a conventional means of acquir-
ing real estate would not justify excluding real estate from the
debt-financed property rules if an exclusion would create the po-
tential for abuse. It was inequitable that exempt organizations
were taxed under section 514 at a more onerous rate than taxable
organizations. Exempt organizations, when subject to tax, should
generally be taxed in the same manner as taxable entities. The
exception to the debt-financed property rules eliminates the ineq-
uity by expanding the range of exempt income for exempt organi-
zations; but again, this would not be an acceptable means of cor-
recting the inequity if it opened up an avenue for abuse.
The pertinent question in considering whether the exception
in section 514(c)(9) should be extended to personal property is
whether transactions in personal property give rise to potential
problems that do not exist with transactions in real property, and
if so, whether these problems can be prevented through provisions
such as those contained in section 514(c)(9) that are directly
aimed at the elements of the transaction giving rise to the objec-
tionable result. This is not an easy question. Given the much-ac-
claimed ingenuity of the tax bar and the complexity of the tax
laws, as well as the complexity of today's financial products, the
section 514(c)(9) exception should not be extended to personal
property without careful deliberation. It is not clear that transac-
tions in personal property will not give rise to new opportunities
for exempt organizations to transfer the benefits of their tax ex-
emption to taxable persons.
CONCLUSION
The debt-financed property rules are not an effective means
of ensuring that charitable organizations are accountable for their
tax exemption. If there is a concern that charitable organizations
are not serving a public purpose, the question should be reviewed
and specific remedies developed. The only remaining reason for
taxing all debt-financed income is the argument that the potential
abuses are so numerous and varied that it is impossible to draft a
statute that would foreclose all objectionable transactions. At least
with respect to real property, Congress seems satisfied that section
160. See supra note 67.
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514(c) (9) is adequate. Its provisions should be extended to all sec-
tion 501(c)(3) organizations because these organizations do not
present any greater potential for objectionable transactions than
do pension trusts and schools. Whether section 514(c)(9) is ade-
quate to prevent objectionable transactions arising from debt-fi-
nanced acquisitions of personal property requires further study.

